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An economic approach to malevolence 
 







Economic  analysis  is  limited  without  logical  justification  to  benevolence.  This  paper 
introduces  an  analysis  of  malevolence.  It  assumes  that  malevolence  may  be  structural  or 
conjunctural. We distinguish between psychology and behavior of individuals. Conjuctural 
malevolence may occur when behavior is no more consistent with psychology.  
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Introduction 
Malevolence is omnipresent in cultural anthropology with general presuppositions assigned 
to malevolent and benevolent populations.  The recent debate on the Shoah begun by D.J. 
Godlhagen (1997) has confirmed this idea, the Germans being presupposed by the author to 
be genocidal.  The recent analysis of genocides has further accentuated these presuppositions 
whether in Rwanda, Bosnia or Sierra Leone.  Malevolence thus is cultural.  Malevolence is 
the characteristic of a population, of a culture, or again, of a period. 
On  the  contrary  to  cultural  anthropology,  malevolence  is  nearly  absent  from  economic 
analysis.  According  to  G.  Becker  (1974  )  the  hypothesis  of  "envy  and  hate"  is  either 
minimized,  in  the  name  of  the  protection  provided  by  the  society  (A.  Smith  1776),  or 
exaggerated to become the driving force of life (T.Veblen 1899)
1. 
In fact, this hypothesis of behavior is generally minimized in economic thinking in so far as 
behavior is determined by hedonism for oneself and for others. According to J. Harsanyi 
(1977) utilitarianism implies moral conventions concerning good will and moral sympathy; 
even if they are "true preferences", we should exclude antisocial preferences.  "In particular, 
we should exclude all antisocial preferences such as sadism, envy, resentment, and malice".  
Not  the  person  but  the  "part"  of  the  person  concerned  by  antisocial  sentiments  is  to  be 
excluded from the community.   
To want others' harm and to find satisfaction in it is a general attitude which deserves to be 
carefully defined in economic language.  We interpret it here in an interpersonal framework, 
while realizing that there also exists deliberate malevolence with regards to oneself, objects, 
or animals: this type of malevolence is not treated here. In the first section we define the 
spectrum of "volency" (the disposition towards an other). This definition allows us to oppose 
a  structural  malevolence  (the  spectrum  of  volency)  against  a  conjunctural  malevolence 
(deformation  in  the  spectrum  of  volency).  Malevolence  can  be  part  of  a  number  of 
configurations and circumstances; it is not by itself  an a priori about human nature. This 
distinction  between  structural  and  conjunctural  malevolence  may  be  analyze  through  the 
difference  between  psychology  and  behavior  of  the  individual  (second  section).  An 
illustration  of  the  volatility  of  volency  towards  the  others,  passing  from  benevolence  to 
malevolence is given (third section).  
 
                                                            
1 ".. every one's desire is to get the better of all by the accumulation of goods", Veblen, 1889, with regard to the 
"financial rivalry" and to the "envious comparison".  
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1.  An  initial  approach  to  the  spectrum  of  “volency”;  structural  or  conjunctural 
malevolence 
Malevolence consists of wanting the harm of the Other and preferring that his utility is 
diminished.  According to H. Sidgwick (1907) it is as natural as benevolence and is composed 
of the following three factors: " a dislike of the presence of its object and a desire to inflict 
pain on it, and also a capacity of deriving pleasure from the pain thus inflicted". 
More recently, malevolence has been expressed in utilities function (for example Cazenave 
and Morrisson 1978) . Let for an individual i the utility function 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) j i i j j i i i x x U x u x u U , or    ,  
 
An individual i will be benevolent, egoistic or malevolent if 
 
0 U or    0 i > ¶ ¶ > ¶ ¶ j j i x u U  (benevolent) ;  
0 U or    0 i < ¶ ¶ < ¶ ¶ j j i x u U (malevolent) ;  
0 U or    0 i = ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ j j i x u U (egoistic) 
 
In this case malevolence consists of wanting evil for the Other.  The Other is considered 
negatively in the sense that his lowering of utility is, deep down in me, what increases my 
utility in the end
2. This definition is only related to the individual psychology and does not 
imply  anything  about  behavior.  Let  us  imagine  an  individual  who  has  an  egalitarian 
preference on income distribution. Figure 1 represents his optimization.  
If the psychology of the individual is egalitarian, he maximizes his utility function at point 
E*.  His  behavior  depends  on  his  initial  position  in  the  income  distribution.  If  the  initial 
situation  is  at  point  E’  individual  i  makes  a  positive  transfer  t
+  toward  j  and  acts  in  a 
benevolent way. On the contrary, if the initial repartition is at point E” he desires a transfer 
from j, t
-, and acts in a malevolent manner. If the initial situation is at point E* he is totally 







                                                            
2 A pathological case that goes further this definition may be illustrate by a malevolent individual who wants evil 
for other but  must suffer a loss of utility by fact of his intention being culpable and punishing him.  
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Figure 1 











This  example  illustrates  the  distinction  between  the  psychology  and  the  behavior  of  an 
individual. de Graaff (1957), Scott (1972), and Brennan (1973) have also used the hypothesis 
of  malevolence  in  this  way.  They  argue  that  voluntary  redistribution  could  come  about 
through the motive of malevolence. They clearly distinguish between the psychology (the 
motive of malevolence) and the behavior (the benevolent voluntary redistribution). 
Our  analysis  develops  this  distinction  in  the  case  of  malevolence.  We  introduce  a 
representation  of  volency  for  an  individual  towards  the  others.  We  may  assume  that 
malevolence,  as  benevolence,  concerns  few  people.  By  making  the  hypothesis  that  my 
neutrality  concerns  most  others  and  my  benevolence  or  malevolence  is  reduced  to  a  few 
people, an initial representation (figure 2) can be given of the spectrum of "volence" towards 
the other (the disposition towards the others). 
Of  course,  some  people  may  have  a  great  benevolence  and  others  may  have  a  great 
malevolence, instead of a neutrality concerning most others. However, the general case seems 
probably to be a strong neutrality  and a benevolence and a malevolence reduce to a few 
people. Indeed, whatever the form of the spectrum of volency towards the others, it is just an 
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This first illustration is related to the way one person sees the others, its psychology.  It 
characterizes  the  structural  situation  of  malevolence.    To  this  "structural"  conception  of 
volency, we may oppose a "conjunctural" conception founded on the fact that each individual 
may develop, depending on the events, all values of volency:  benevolence, malevolence and 
neutrality form a complete spectrum through which our behavior may pass at any moment.  
H. Sidgwick reminds us that malevolence is the "exact counterpart" of benevolence and that 
one can not avoid passing towards it in a case of aggression, for example. Each of us is 
capable of passing from extreme benevolence to extreme malevolence with regards to some 
people, while remaining neutral towards others categories of the population. Malevolence is 
transitory, resulting  from aggression for instance. Then conjunctural malevolence is related to 
behavior. 
The spectrum may in this way experience conjunctural "deformations", for example, in case 
of conflict, an increase in the distribution of the zone of malevolence.  It is possible therefore 
to  conceive  malevolence  simultaneously  (structural  effect)  with  benevolence  and  also 
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A classic example of a cause of deformation of the spectrum of volency is inheritance.  
Families  appear  relatively  united,  but  may  dissolve  through  conflicts  connected  with 
inheritance.  Benevolence transforms itself sometimes into malevolence.  Thus, a shock to the 
structure  (such  as  inheritance)  will  transform  it  more  or  less  depending  on  its  degree  of 
robustness and its resistance to shocks. Another example may be found. Let us consider the 
most famous anthropology of malevolence: that of the Iks as theorized by C. Turnbull (1987).  
A  population  a  priori  benevolent  becomes  malevolent  following  the  classifying  of  their 
hunting grounds as a nature reserve.  Thus people may be successively in a given period 
benevolent and malevolent.  
To capture the distinction between psychology and behavior, we focus, in the next section, 
on the economic analysis of the deformation of the spectrum of volency, i.e. the conjunctural 
malevolence.  
 
2. Conjunctural malevolence: an analyzis 
We  have  considered  that  the  structural  form  of  the  spectrum  of  volency  represents  the 
psychology  of  the  individual  toward  the  others.  If  his  behavior  is  consistent  with  his 
psychology then the spectrum does not know any deformation. The conjunctural deformation 
of the spectrum comes from a difference between the behavior and the psychology
3. The 
structural  form  corresponds  to  an  adequation  between  the  psychology  and  the  behavior, 
whereas the conjunctural deformation marks a difference between the psychology and the 
behavior.  
This distinction may be illustrated by a simple game. The following matrix 1 represents this 
game: 
Matrix 1 
Behaviors  B  M 
B  bb,bb   bm, mb   
M  mb, bm   mm, mm  
 
In this game, B and M are successively benevolent and malevolent behaviors. Bb is the gain 
from  the  strategy  benevolent/benevolent,  whereas  mm  is  the  result  of  the  strategy 
malevolent/malevolent and corresponding to the Nash equilibrium. On the contrary bb is a 
mutually beneficial strategy.  
                                                            
3 In this case, cognitive dissonance may induce a modification in the behavior or a change in the psychology, or 
also some psychological troubles. However, we don’t treat this question here.     
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We now set the psychology of the individual. We write ai the disposition of i toward the 
others and (1-ai) the self-interest of i. Any restriction is put on the value of a. It may be 
positive in case of benevolence or negative in case of malevolence. Let us assume also that aj  
is the expected disposition of others j toward i and (1-aj) the expected self-interest of others j 
by  i  for  themselves.  As  ai,  aj  may  be  positive  or  negative  according  to  the  expected 
benevolence or malevolence of j by i. 
In this game, the benevolent strategy will be choose only if 
 
(bb) (1-ai)aj + (bb)aiaj + (bm) (1-ai)(1-aj) + (mb)ai(1-aj)>(mb)(1-ai)aj+(bm)aiaj  (1) 
 
The behavior assume by individual i depends on three parameters: the expected gain of his 
behavior, his psychology, and the expected behavior of the others. From this, four results are 
derived. 
 
1.  That for any expected value of the behavior of the others, it exists a critical value a*i of 
the psychology of i which determine his benevolent or malevolent behavior; 
2.  As corollary, that an individual with a benevolent psychology may act in a malevolent 
way and conversely; 
3.  More  the  expected  value  of  the  benevolent  behavior  of  the  others  is  high,  less  it  is 
necessary to have a benevolent psychology to act in a benevolent manner, and the same 
for malevolence; 
4.  If individual has a perfect egoistic psychology, parameter of his psychology is equal to 0 
and his behavior depends only on the expected behavior of the others. 
 
We may illustrate these results by a numerical example. Let the following game in matrix 2 
Matrix 2 
Behaviors  B  M 
B  2,2  0,1   
M  1,0  -2,-2 
 
The inequation (1) becomes 
(1-ai)aj + 2aiaj + ai(1-aj)>0              (2)  
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1.  For ai benevolent and equal to 0,5. Any value aj <-0,5 induces a malevolent behavior of 
i. Then, with a benevolent psychology the individual will have a malevolent behavior 
because he expected a malevolent behavior of the others. A deformation of the spectrum 
of volency is produced. We attend a difference between psychology and behavior. 
2.  Conversely, for ai malevolent and equal to –0,5, any value aj >0,5 induces a benevolent 
behavior of i. As i expected a benevolent behavior of the others he acts himself in a 
benevolent way. He assumes a distinct behavior to his psychology. Again a deformation 
of the spectrum of volency appear, but in the benevolent side. 
 
In these conditions, a change in expected behavior of the others may imply a change in the 
behavior of individual i who may pass from benevolence to malevolence or from malevolence 
to benevolence. Malevolence may be conjunctural, corresponding to a behavior distinct to the 
psychology.  This  shift  form  benevolence  to  malevolence  may  occur  in  particular  context 
where  expected  behavior  of  the  others  favors  malevolent  acts.  The  next  section  gives  an 
example of this configuration. 
 
3. An illustration of conjunctural malevolence. 
In our analysis, the situations of malevolence are not random, they occur in a social sphere 
and a favorable conjuncture, more particularly in certain situations which involve a strong 
social  interaction.  We  use  the  example  of  the  Producers/Consumers  of  impoverished 
pluriactivity to illustrate it. 
The informal pluriactivity associates people in the micro-markets in a complex web.  This 
edifice  demands  collective  organizations:    micro-markets,  sharing  of  tasks  (notably  in 
construction), reciprocal benevolence.   This could also be the rights of redistribution, in a 
solvent society, but poverty is such that it drives the population to social interaction based on 
pluriactivity.   
With pluriactivity, income is doubled in rural areas in Burundi (F.R.Mahieu et al., 1992); 
this activity supplies a supplement of cash (70% of the latest banknote of 1000Fbu come from 
this activity).  It allows thus "to deal with the everyday needs of food, housekeeping and 
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In this framework, impoverished pluriactivity is particularly  fragile.   The necessity  of  a 
pluriactivity implies, in turn, the necessity of a reciprocal benevolence in order to organize the 
reaction against poverty.  
Though the first investigations into pluriactivity in rural areas (F.R.Mahieu et al., 1992; 
J.P.Hubert, 1993) sketch the modes of life in stable situations, the recompositions in unstable 
situations remain unknown.   Hubert sketches out the idea of a segmentation in rural areas 
between  a core of labor force employed in pluriactivity and a proletarianized fringe; this 
internal movement in rural areas would contradict the fatalism of the models of rural exodus.  
Nevertheless, A.Guichaoua insists in his investigations of 1989 into the weak differentiation 
of rural Burundian society: the impoverished pluriactivity maintains a quite similar living 
standard among the totality of rural households.  The impoverished pluriactivity maintains a 
hillside in a framework of solidarity. 
From a strong demographic pressure, the ratio man/land is critical in mountain agriculture.  
On one hand it must remain high to allow the achievement of agriculture in terraces; on the 
other hand, the pressure for land must not pass a critical threshold, or it will lead to an "ethnic 
re-creation", and therefore a forced exodus.  
Initially  (figure  3),  the  pluriactivity  (expressed  in  quantities  produced)  develops  on  a 
benevolent base.  This condition an activity founded on a close proximity and confidence just 
until a stage O1 of collective obligations.  With the development of the activity, benevolence 
decreases when the saturation of work and available land is reached, and migration becomes 
indispensable.  In this configuration the producer/consumer dynamics no longer allows the 
progression of needs to be satisfied.  At a third stage, a fall in activities causes growing 
impoverishment and a behavior increasingly malevolent.  In the end, a migration is sustained 















































Such a diagram corresponds roughly to the situation of  Burundi after its entry into a period 
of structural adjustment, in 1987.  A priori, the collective obligations assure survival by an 
informal pluriactivity up to point B even though the ratio man/land is very unfavorable
4 .  The 
international  organizations  impose  very  labor  intensive  crops  (tea,  arabica  coffee)  and 
therefore the threshold of saturation is surpassed.  Some results are obtained up until point A 
(1991 - 1992) and migration begins to increase towards poor zones, for example towards the 
frontier  of  Tanzania.    In  1993,  the  situation  is  characterized  by  an  important  decrease  in 
production, a growing malevolence which finishes in major conflicts (100 000 civilians killed 
in 1993) and a migratory panic (500 000 displaced people). 
 
4. Conclusion 
Malevolence is not fatally cultural, inherent in the "fragmentation" of human society through 
race or class, subject to anthropological prejudices.  It can be analyzed in a totally different 
manner at the center of the economic theory.  To do this, we distinguish between psychology 
and behavior of individuals. 
                                                            
4 The ratio density of the population/used agricultural surface can reach, in certain regions, 800 inhabitants per 
square kilometer.  

















 In economic calculations, the internalization of malevolence, for the same reason as for 
benevolence, plays an important role.  It allows the economic analysis of current  phenomena 
of conflict, cheating, or others still more unusual or dramatic such as the ethnic conflicts and 
genocide. 
Malevolence becomes in this last case very rational.  If it happens that the utility of one or 
more  people  becomes  greater  as  the  utility  of  others  diminishes,  then  a  monstrous 
utilitarianism  may  be  put  into  place,  making  the  "final  solution",  a  rational  and  radical 
method.    The  genocides,  whether  Armenian,  nazi,  Bosnian,  or  Rwandan,  have  shown 
evidence of a methodical organization designed to have the maxim efficiency in bringing 
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